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I launched an investigation into convergences between the logic of terrorist destruction and 
contemporary Islamophobic policies through my research on art and tourism. This incongruous 
statement begins to make sense if one considers how, security concerns aside, counter-terrorist 
measures allow nation-states to demonstrate a civilised image on the global scene. The badge of 
civility has been claimed by many political units and has permeated narratives of Western 
modernity. The idea of fostering a globally plausible self-image, however, is constitutive of what 
can be (and has been) termed Ǯcosmetic cosmopolitanismǯ. This cosmopolitanism, which 
prioritises self-presentation and plausible facades, has more ambiguous origins than that which 
elevates the possibility of fostering human togetherness on a global scale to the status of a 
political project. We must bear in mind that the original story of acquiring and losing Ǯimageǯ or 
Ǯfaceǯ stems from biblical narratives of the Original Sin. The Fall of Adam and Eve from Paradise, 
which was achieved through the collaboration of Woman with an Evil Snake, both gendered and 
coloured the archetypical tale of knowledge. The selfsame story haunted continental philosophy, 
especially the founders and followers of post-Hegelian ethics and Levinassian alterity. How ironic, 
then, to re-encounter this story into late modern configurations of counter-terrorist civility. In 
this paper I argue that contemporary anti-terrorist image-making policies mirror the ways 
Western theosophical discourse imagined humans as gendered and racialised beings. 
Significantly, ǯ         ǡ  
organisations, but victimised nation-states appear to operate on the selfsame principles as their 
enemies.  
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Contemporary terror is inextricably tied in Western public spheres with Islam. From the 9/11 
tragedy onwards, right to the 7/7 London bombings and the Jyllands-Posten cartoon 
controversyǡ      Ǯǯ        
ǤǮǯǢ
just as xenophobia, the concept appeals to commonsensical ways of knowing, fearing and 
rejecting other cultures. The fear of Islam is the fear of otherness within our social and cultural 
domain Ȃ the stranger of Simmel and Bauman, if you like. In this respect, Muslim communities 
seem to have assumed in racial stereotyping the function of Jewish diasporas that stretched to 
the four corners of the world and joined diverse societies without renouncing the memory of 
their own distinctive origins. Unlike the Jewish diaspora however, Muslim communities do not 
seem to have a single, well-define Ǯǯ. Here the Islamophobic discourse on terror has 
  ǣ         Ǯǯ   and 
collective reputations, it also granted Muslim communities arbitrarily with an imagined territorial 
nodeǡ   ǮǯǤ  Ǯǯ     ǡ   
nefarious plans are produced and then trafficked into Western national and transnational spaces.  
 
Consider how this trafficking is held accountable for the symbolic violation of national 
cultures around the world. The mass rapes of women in war zones, a practice in developing 
countries that destroys the intimate space of the family and publically humiliates the head of kin 
obeys to the same political logic. This logic draws upon globalised themes of honour and shame, 
with the former remaining masculinised and the latter feminised. Islamophobic discourse 
feminises national cultures to valorise the value of Western democracy and civility at the expense 
of ethno-cultural difference. A vicious circle commences here:  ǯ Ǯshamingǯ of 
Western nation-ǯ
reputation. State reputation is literally and symbolically associated here with the role of icons and 
Ǯfacesǯ (and it may be pertinent to draw parallels here with the Christian practice of worshipping 
God through actual icons). There are no better examples of this paradox than those proffered by 
 ?Ȁ ? ?ǯǯ; or, in  ?Ȁ ?ǯ
case, the selection  ǯ    , the transport system, 
used both by the cityǯs prestigious business labour and its global tourists.  
  
But we know full well that even Western domains are regulated by internal divides and 
cultural, ecǤǯǡ
its conception, accounts for the presence of static ideological centres within otherwise fluid 
Bauman Institute, 6-7 September 2010 
 
3 
 
    Ǯǯ  ǮǯǤ      d like to anchor my 
analysis. I will place my anthropological spyglass on the imaginary margins of the European 
civilised world to do so, where Ǯbackward customsǯ began to fade in recent decades, especially 
with the Ǯhelpǯ of tourist and technological expansion. We think that the code of honour and 
masculinity foregrounds social action and policy only in these marginal countries just because 
they are marginal Ȃ ǡ Ǯǯ. If, however, we change our perspective, we will see 
more clearly how the same code of preserving state honour colours the background of Western 
democracies. When George W. Bush argued that either the world sides with America to eliminate 
Islamic    Ǯ  ǯǡ ǡ he was called a patriot, not a bigot or 
ǮbackwardǯǤ  ǡ    ǯ    Ǯǯ 
revealed the theological underpinnings of the War on Terror as well as the fact that American 
imperialist nationalism is reminiscent of the honour cultures it seeks to destroy: not only did 
Islamist terrorists (if indeed Islamist terrorists co-ordinated the 9/11 tragedy) manage to turn 
Western mobilities into a deadly weapon, they also gained in unprecedented global prestige 
through them. Just as Western honour codes are beaten by Eastern honour codes, Western 
technology is beaten by its reproduction by the terrorist savages it seeks to eliminate. The most 
powerful terrorist weapon is visual, electronic and hyperlinked. Not only does electronic and 
broadcast terrorism demonstrate the Ǯvillainsǯǯ ability to globally broadcast faceless threats, it can 
also ensure that when these threats materialize, the victimized state loses in global standing.  
 
I want to look at some recent political developments in Greece to better illustrate Western 
ǯ  . Because of the ancient Hellenic culture that thrived in the same 
peninsula in which the modern Greek state and nation were founded, Greece was pronounced 
the centre of European civilisation early on. But the colonisation of the peninsula by Ottoman 
Turks between the 15th and the 19th centuries stripped modern Greeks of their Hellenic glamour. 
Western patronage and intellectual Hellenomania instilled this inferiority complex in them, also 
making the search for global prestige the Greek nation-ǯ. This has been a 
priority from the foundation of modern Greece in 1832 until today. Decades of endemic political 
corruption allowed things to come full circle in 2009, with the announcement in effect of state 
bankruptcy in 2010 and a formal request for European aid. For a country that had allegedly lent its 
glamorous ancient civilisation to the Western world, losing face globally altogether was the 
ultimate political humiliation. This triggered internally a double reactive mechanism (one 
controlled by the centre and another by the masses) with several targets (the state itself, the 
European community, Western Ǯpatronageǯ and even the idea of state order itself). The fear of 
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Islamic contamination had already reared its ugly face domestically in late 2008 when, following 
an altercation between police and a group of youths in the Exarcheia district of Athens, the 15-
year old Alexis Grigoropoulos was shot and killed by a police officer. The murder inflamed the 
Greek public to such an extent that rioting crowds in Athens, Thessaloniki and a number of 
European cities generated mayhem with demonstrations and extended violence that lasted for 
weeks. Global media discourse began to draw unsavoury comparisons with the riots of Greek 
dissident groups against the junta of 1968-1974, a dictatorship that isolated Greece on the global 
plateau with its paranoid anti-communist and racist agenda. The actions of the conservative 
government of Nea Dimokratia in 2008 further encouraged connections of state violence against 
rioting groups with the Albanian identity of the victim. Of immigrant parentage, Grigoropoulos 

ǯethnic difference, but underneath this, more 
associative chains were formed. Historically, Albanian pre-national communities played a 
significant role in the production of Greek national identity and the nation-stateǯs foundation. 
Centralised policies subsequently criminalised and expunged these communities from national 
self-definitions: their mobile, nomadic character is comparable to modern migrations in Europe, 
after all. At the time, in search of global recognition, the Greek nation-state followed Western 
political scripts that excluded anything associated with Ottoman Islam from European civilisation. 
Coming from the Ottoman empire into Greek territories, Albanian communities were 
conveniently cast as undesired Eastern invaders of Greek national culture. Contemporary 
Albanian migrations reproduced this Albanophobic narrative, aligning Greek immigration policies 
with other Western agendas.  
 
I do not wish to examine Greek nation-building as an exceptional instance, only to highlight 
how such policies of Ǯsaving faceǯ in the global political plateau illustrate a Western mentalité that 
draws upon precisely what it aspires to supersede. I refer to the archaic (masculinised) logic of 
honour that seeks the preservation of political prestige at the expense of (feminised) ethnic 
difference.  ǡ  Ǯǯ   -states 
terrorists attack. Ethnic communities within the nation-state retain an ambivalent place in 
national self-narration, a potentially contaminant quality that may shame and humiliate the 
ǯ Ǥ Saving face, preserving national honour intact, necessitates constant control, 
manipulation and assimilation of ethnic difference. Contemporary political discourse in Western 
domains emulates the original theological discourse that gendered and coloured evil but 
represses the origins of this emulation. It is not a coincidence that in the Greek case, killing a 
migrant demonstrator was presented as a sound way to maintain public order in an increasingly 
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dangerous world of mobile enemies with no face but many dangerous plans. Greek 
neoconservative debates on criminalising the use of hoods in public also mirrored in this context 
of anti-state demonstrations Western phobias regarding the public uses of hijab. The loss of face 
gestured here to the ethnic demonstratorsǯ lack of phenomenological whiteness - an evidently 
gendered and racialised motif that cost the lives of innocent suspects in both the Greek and 
British cases (post 7/7 arrests and killings). 
  
According to Greek public discussants, the promises the government of Nea Dimokratia had 
made in 2007 to win re-election were never realised. The promises included reforming the social 
and economic system and the privatization of ailing public institutions such as Olympic Airlines so 
that Greece becomes more integrated into Europe. Instead, a series of economic and political 
scandals involving the Church, an increase in violent crime and a sluggish legal system wasted 
public funds and patience until a single shooting was enough to spread terror. High levels of 
unemployment stemming from governmental inability to implement functional reforms in 
education and the labour market worsened things. The 2008 events had coincided with a visit by 
Thomas Hammarberg, Commissioner for Human Rights of the Council of Europe (8-10 December 
2008), to northern bordeline regions that have a larger concentration of ethnic minorities. 
ǯ on his visit highlighted the problematic treatment of Muslim minorities by 
the Greek state, cautioning the authorities on issues regarding citizenship rights. His report came 
ǯǡ
ǯ
synchronise with socio-political changes at European level.  
 
Falling from the paradise of civilisation is a fear shared by all national Leviathans. George 
Bush had proudly stated in 2005 how the American nation stood guard on the tense borders of 
civilisation Islamic villains sought to destroy: ǮIn this new century, freedom is once again 
assaulted by enemies determined to roll back generations of democratic progress. Once again, 
we're responding to a global campaign of fear with a global campaign of freedom. And once 
again, we will see freedom's victoryǯ, he claimed. Behind this pseudo-utopian message laid 
hidden a totalitarian vision of humanity, akin to that propagated in the 1960s by the Greek junta. 
Its motto (Ǯǡ ǡ ǯ), sums up contemporary anti-immigration trends and 
Islamophobic attitudes we saw emerging with the Bush administration, then spreading across 
the world like a new disease. The idea of familial bonding and kinship systems, ceremoniously 
attributed to the Eastern honour rationale,    
 ǯ   
ǯǤ 
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What kind of conclusion could one draw from these reflections? The prioritisation of prestige 
compels nation-states to destroy internal reciprocities to construct and reconstruct their own 
image in a community of nations. This self-destructive streak is stylistically identical to the 
forceful seclusion of Muslim women in the private sphere of home, where they cannot be 
shamed and    ǯ Ǥ Irrespectively of the heterogeneous purposes 
contemporary terrorism may carry or the interpretation of terrorist action by various political 
actors, its logic remains the same. The concerns of victimised nation-states also remain identical 
to Islamic terrorist objectives. The two sides end up mirroring each other. In Western 
democracies we would like to believe that we left behind the religious fundamentalism that does 
indeed guide the destructive actions of such terrorist groups. But we forget that our concern for 
prestige obeys to the rules of Christian cosmology, or that our re-active and pro-active policies 
merely replicate terrorist destruction, only they turn it inwards, against ethnic suspects, hoodies 
and veiled women. Protagonists in this vicious circle of violence are neither the national 
ǮǯǤ
global consumption, a symbolic value on which illegal groups can capitalise. 
